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Abstract
The HTTPS ecosystem is the foundation on which Internet security is built. At the heart of this
ecosystem is the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, which in turn uses the X.509 public-
key infrastructure and numerous cryptographic constructions and algorithms. Unfortunately,
this ecosystem is extremely brittle, with headline-grabbing attacks and emergency patches many
times a year. We describe our ongoing efforts in Everest,1 a project that aims to build and deploy
a verified version of TLS and other components of HTTPS, replacing the current infrastructure
with proven, secure software.
Aiming both at full verification and usability, we conduct high-level code-based, game-playing
proofs of security on cryptographic implementations that yield efficient, deployable code, at the
level of C and assembly. Concretely, we use F?, a dependently typed language for programming,
meta-programming, and proving at a high level, while relying on low-level DSLs embedded within
1 The Everest VERified End-to-end Secure Transport: https://project-everest.github.io.
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F? for programming low-level components when necessary for performance and, sometimes, side-
channel resistance. To compose the pieces, we compile all our code to source-like C and assembly,
suitable for deployment and integration with existing code bases, as well as audit by independent
security experts.
Our main results so far include (1) the design of Low?, a subset of F? designed for C-like
imperative programming but with high-level verification support, and KreMLin, a compiler
that extracts Low? programs to C; (2) an implementation of the TLS-1.3 record layer in Low?,
together with a proof of its concrete cryptographic security; (3) Vale, a new DSL for verified
assembly language, and several optimized cryptographic primitives proven functionally correct
and side-channel resistant. In an early deployment, all our verified software is integrated and
deployed within libcurl, a widely used library of networking protocols.
1998 ACM Subject Classification F.3.1 Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about Programs
Keywords and phrases Security, Cryptography, Verification, TLS
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/LIPIcs.SNAPL.2017.1
1 Introduction
The Internet’s core security infrastructure is frighteningly brittle. As more and more services
rely on encryption, security best practices urge developers to use standard, widely-used
components like HTTPS and SSL (the latter is now standardized as TLS). As a result, the
same pervasive components are used for securing communications on the Web and for VoIP,
email, VPNs, and the IoT.
Unfortunately, these standard components are themselves often broken in many ways.
Even before recent headline-grabbing attacks like HeartBleed2, FREAK3, and Logjam4 entire
papers [21, 10] were published just to summarize all of the academically “interesting” ways
TLS implementations have been broken, without even getting into “boring” vulnerabilities
like buffer overflows and other basic coding mistakes. This tide of flaws shows no signs
of abating; in the year after those papers were published, 54 new CVE security advisories
were published just for TLS. These flaws are frequently found and fixed in all of the widely
used TLS implementations, as well as in the larger HTTPS ecosystem. They span a wide
gamut including memory management mistakes, errors in protocol state machines, lax X.509
certificate parsing and validation, weak or badly implemented cryptographic algorithms, side
channels, and even genuine design flaws5 in the standards. Furthermore, because many TLS
implementations expose truly terrible APIs, HTTPS applications built on them regularly
make devastating mistakes [12].
These persistent problems have generated sufficient industry concern that both Google
and the OpenBSD project are building separate forks of OpenSSL (BoringSSL and LibreSSL,
respectively) while Amazon is developing a brand new implementation (s2n). Many corpo-
rations have even joined the multi-million-dollar Core Infrastructure Initiative to support
additional testing and security auditing of open-source projects, starting with OpenSSL.
2 https://heartbleed.com/
3 https://freakattack.com/
4 https://weakdh.org/
5 https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE
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Figure 1 Everest architecture.
1.1 A Need for Verified Deployments Now
While the industry is taking incremental steps to try to stem the persistent tide of vul-
nerabilities, the programming-language community is uniquely positioned to definitively
solve this problem. The science of software verification has progressed to a point where a
large team of experts can reasonably expect to build a fully verified software stack, e.g.,
seL4 [16], Ironclad [14], and CertiKOS [13], with still more ambitious, broadly ranging efforts
already underway (e.g., http://deepspec.org/). Yet, even when augmented with secure
communication components like TLS, a fully verified stack would not meet today’s pressing
needs, since a wholesale replacement of the software stack is not in the offing.
Improving the current software landscape requires both a dramatic shift in software
development methodology and an incremental approach to the deployment of verified software.
Everest is a new joint project between Microsoft Research and INRIA that aims to
build verified software components and deploy them within the existing software ecosystem.
Specifically, Everest develops new implementations of existing protocols and standards used
for web communications. At a minimum, we prove our implementations functionally correct.
Beyond functional correctness, we integrate cryptographic modeling and protocol analysis
to prove, by reduction to computational assumptions on their core algorithms, that our
implementations provide secure-channel abstractions between the communicating endpoints.
Our verified code is implemented in F? [25, 1], a dependently typed programming language
and proof assistant, and in several DSLs embedded within F?.
After verification, in support of incremental deployment, our code is extracted by verified
tools to C and assembly, and compiled further by off-the-shelf C compilers (e.g., gcc and
clang, but also, at a performance cost, verified compilers like CompCert [18]) and composed
with adapters that interface our verified code with existing software components, like the
web browsers, servers and other communication software shown in the Figure 1. Being only
as strong as its weakest component, software systems that include verified Everest code may
not be impervious to attack; yet, any attack such a system suffers will be attributable to a
flaw in a component outside Everest, while simple, critical systems may be within reach of
full verification with a reasonable marginal effort.
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Figure 2 Low? embedded in F?, compiled to C, with soundness and security guarantees.
1.2 Structure of this Paper
Everest is a work in progress – we present an overview of the methodology we have used
so far. Our main guiding principle is to provide low-level, efficient implementations of
various protocol standards by extracting them from fresh code, programmed and verified at
a high-level of abstraction. This principle applies best for relatively small and complex code,
such as a secure protocol stack.
To this end, in §2, we present Low?, an embedded sub-language of F? geared towards
programming against a C-like memory model, while specifying and proving these programs
within F?’s dependent type theory. Low? programs are extracted to C by a new tool
called KreMLin: although we have yet to verify the implementation of KreMLin, we have
formally modeled its translation and proved on paper that it preserves the functionality of
programs to the level of CompCert’s Clight. We have also showed that compilation from
Low? to Clight does not introduce any side-channels due to memory access patterns.
In §3, we sketch several examples of verified code and their specifications in Low?, showing
how we state and prove memory safety, functional correctness, and cryptographic security.
In §4, we discuss a few strands of ongoing work. This includes the design of Vale, a
new DSL for verified assembly language programming and its use in producing even lower
level, efficient, functionally correct implementations of the AES and SHA256 algorithms
whose performance is on par with OpenSSL, the mostly widely used implementation. We
also discuss an early deployment of Everest software as a drop-in replacement for TLS in
libcurl, and its use from within a command-line git client.
Finally, §5 presents some parting thoughts, covering some opportunities and challenges.
For more technical details, we refer the reader to three recent papers describing our
verification of the TLS-1.3 record layer [6]; the design and implementation of Low? and
KreMLin [5]; and the design and implementation of Vale [9].
2 Low?: Verified Low-level Programming Embedded in F?
We aim to bridge the gap between high-level, safe-by-construction code, optimized for clarity
and ease of verification, and low-level code exerting fine control over data representations
and memory layout in order to achieve better performance. Towards this end, we introduce
Low?, a DSL for verified, efficient low-level programming, embedded within F?, a verification-
oriented, ML-like language with dependent types and SMT-based automation [11]. Figure 2
illustrates the high-level design of Low? and its compilation to native code.
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Libraries for low-level programming within F?. At its core, F? is a purely functional
language to which effects like state are added programmatically using monads. We instantiate
the state monad of F? to use a CompCert-like structured memory model [18, 19] that separates
the stack and the heap, supporting transient allocation on the stack, and allocating and
freeing individual reference cells on the heap – this is not the “big array of bytes” model
systems programmers sometimes use. The heap is organized into disjoint logical regions,
which enables stating separation properties necessary for modular, stateful verification. On
top of this, we program a library of buffers – C-style arrays passed by reference – with
support for pointer arithmetic and referring to only part of an array. By virtue of F? typing,
our libraries and all their well-typed clients are guaranteed to be memory safe, e.g., they
never access out-of-bounds or deallocated memory.
Designing Low?, a subset of F? easily compiled to C. We intend to give Low? programmers
precise control over the performance profile of the generated C code. As much as possible,
we aim for the programmer to have control even over the syntactic structure of the target
C code, to facilitate its review by security experts unfamiliar with F?. As such, to a first
approximation, Low? programs are F? programs well-typed in the state monad described
above, which, after all their computationally irrelevant (ghost) parts have been erased, must
satisfy several requirements. Specifically, the code (1) must be first order, to prevent the
need to allocate closures in C; (2) must not perform any implicit allocations; (3) must not
use recursive datatypes, since these would have to be compiled using additional indirections
to C structs; and (4) must be monomorphic, since C does not support polymorphism directly.
We emphasize that these restrictions apply only to computationally relevant code: proofs
and specifications are free to use arbitrary higher-order, dependently typed F?.
A dual interpretation of Low?, via compilation to OCaml or Clight. Low? programs
interoperate naturally with other F? programs, and precise specifications of Low? and F? code
are intermingled when proving properties of their combination. As usual in F?, programs are
type-checked and compiled to OCaml for execution, after erasing computationally irrelevant
parts of a program, e.g., proofs and specifications, using a process similar to Coq’s extraction
mechanism [20]. Importantly, Low? programs have a second, equivalent but more efficient
semantics via compilation to C, with a predictable performance model including manual
memory management – this is implemented by KreMLin, a new compiler from the Low?
subset of F? to C.
Justifying its dual interpretation as a subset of F? and a subset of C, we give a translation
from Low?, via two intermediate languages, to CompCert’s Clight [8] and show that it
preserves trace equivalence with respect to the original F? semantics of the program. In
addition to ensuring that the functional behavior of a program is preserved, our trace
equivalence also guarantees that the compiler does not introduce unexpected side-channels
due to memory access patterns, at least until it reaches Clight – a useful sanity check for
cryptographic code.
KreMLin, a compiler from Low? to C. Our formal model guides the implementation of
KreMLin, a new tool that emits C code from Low?. Although the implementation of
KreMLin is not verified yet, we plan to verify its main translation phased based on our
formal model in the near future. KreMLin is designed to emit well-formatted, idiomatic C
code suitable for manual review and audit by independent security experts unfamiliar with
our verification methodology. The resulting C programs can be compiled with CompCert
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for greatest assurance, and with mainstream C compilers, including GCC and Clang, for
greatest performance. We have used KreMLin to extract to C the 20,000+ lines of Low?
code we have written so far.
Our formal results cover the translation of standalone Low? programs to C, proving that
execution in C preserves the original F? semantics of the Low? program. More pragmatically,
we have built several cryptographic libraries in Low?, compiled them to ABI-compatible C,
allowing them to be used as drop-in replacements for existing libraries in C or any other
language. The performance of our verified code after KreMLin extraction is comparable to
existing (unverified) cryptographic libraries in C.
3 Proving Cryptographic Implementations in Low?
In this section, we sketch a few simple fragments of code from HACL?, a high-assurance
cryptographic library programmed and verified in Low? and used in our verified implementation
of the TLS-1.3 record layer. First, we illustrate functional correctness properties proven of an
efficient implementation of the Poly1305 Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm [2].
Then, we discuss our model of game-based cryptography in F? and its use in proving security
of the main authenticated encryption construction used in TLS-1.3.
3.1 Functional Correctness of Poly1305
Arithmetic for the Poly1305 MAC algorithm is performed modulo the prime 2130 − 5, i.e.,
the algorithm works in the finite field GF (2130 − 5). To specify modular arithmetic in this
field in F?, we make use of refinement types, as shown below.
val p = 2^130 − 5 (∗ the prime order of the field ∗)
type elem = n:nat {n < p} (∗ abstract field element ∗)
let ( + ) (x y : elem) : elem = (x + y) % p (∗ field addition ∗)
let ( ∗ ) (x y : elem) : elem = (x ∗ y) % p (∗ field multiplication ∗)
This code uses F? infinite-precision natural numbers (nat) to define the prime order p of
the field and the type of field elements, elem, inhabited by natural numbers n smaller than
p. It also defines two infix operators for addition and multiplication in the field in terms
of arithmetic on nat. Their result is annotated with elem, to indicate that these operations
return field elements. The F? typechecker automatically checks that the result is in the
field; it would report an error if, for example, we omitted the reduction modulo p. These
operations are convenient to specify polynomial computations but are much too inefficient
for deployable code.
Instead, typical 32-bit implementations of Poly1305 represent field elements as mutable
arrays of five unsigned 32-bit integers, each holding 26 bits. This representation evenly
spreads out the bits across the integers, so that carries during arithmetic operations can be
delayed. It also enables an efficient modulo operation for p.
We show below an excerpt of the interface of our lower-level verified implementation,
relying on the definitions above to specify their correctness. The type repr defines the
representation of field elements as buffers (mutable arrays) of five 32-bit integers. It is
marked as abstract, to protect the representation invariant from the rest of the code.
1 abstract type repr = buffer UInt32.t 5 (∗ 5-limb representation ∗)
2 val ‘_.[_] ‘: memory → repr → Ghost elem (∗ m.[r] is the value of r in m ∗)
3 val multiply: e0:repr → e1:repr → ST unit (∗ e0 := e0 ∗ e1 ∗)
4 (requires (λ m → e0 ∈ m ∧ e1 ∈ m ∧ disjoint e0 e1))
5 (ensures (λ m0 _ m1 → modifies {e0} m0 m1 ∧ m1.[e0] = m0.[e0] ∗ m0.[e1]))
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Table 1 Performance in CPU cycles: 64-bit HACL?, 64-bit Sodium (pure C, no assembly), 64-bit
OpenSSL (pure C, no assembly). All code was compiled using gcc -O3 optimized and run on a
64-bit Intel Xeon CPU E5-1630. Results are averaged over 1000 measurements, each processing a
random block of 214 bytes; Curve25519 was averaged over 1000 random key-pairs.
Algorithm HACL? Sodium OpenSSL
ChaCha20 6.17 cy/B 6.97 cy/B 8.04 cy/B
Salsa20 6.34 cy/B 8.44 cy/B N/A
Poly1305 2.07 cy/B 2.48 cy/B 2.16 cy/B
Curve25519 157k cy/mul 162k cy/mul 359k cy/mul
Functions are declared with a series of argument types (separated by → ) ending with an
effect and a return type (e.g., Ghost elem, ST unit, etc.). Functions may have logical pre- and
post-conditions that refer to their arguments, their result, and their effects on the memory.
If they access buffers, they typically have a pre-condition requiring their caller to prove that
the buffers are live in the current memory.
The term m.[r] selects the contents of a buffer r from a memory m; it is used in specifications
only, as indicated by the Ghost effect annotation on the final arrow of its type on line 2. The
multiply function is marked as ST, to indicate a stateful computation that may read, write
and allocate state. In a computation type ST a (requires pre) (ensures post), a is the result type
of the computation, pre is a predicate on the input state, and post is a relation between the
input state, the result value, and the final state. ST computations are also guaranteed to
not leak any memory. The specification of multiply requires that its arguments are live in the
initial memory (m) and refer to non-overlapping regions of memory; it computes the product
of its two arguments and overwrites e0 with the result. Its post-condition states that the
value of e0 in the final memory is the field multiplication of its value in the initial memory
with that of e1, and that multiply does not modify any other existing memory location.
Implementing and proving that multiply meets its mathematical specification involves
hundreds of lines of source code, including a custom, verified Bignum library in Low? [26].
Using this library, we implement poly1305_mac and prove it functionally correct.
1 val poly1305_mac:
2 tag:nbytes 16ul →
3 len:u32 → msg:nbytes len{disjoint tag msg} →
4 key:nbytes 32ul{disjoint msg key ∧ disjoint tag key} → ST unit
5 (requires (λ h → msg ∈ h ∧ key ∈ h ∧ tag ∈ h))
6 (ensures (λ h0 _ h1 → let r = Spec.clamp h0.[sub key 0ul 16ul] in
7 let s = h0.[sub key 16ul 16ul] in
8 modifies {tag} h0 h1 ∧
9 h1.[tag] == Spec.mac_1305 (encode_bytes h0.[msg]) r s))
Its specification above states that the final value of the 16 byte tag (h1.[tag]) is the value of
Spec.mac_1305, a polynomial of the message and the key encoded as field elements.
Performance of HACL?. Besides the Poly1305 MAC, HACL? provides functionally correct,
side-channel resistant implementations of the ChaCha20 [22] and Salsa20 [4] ciphers, and
multiplication on the Curve25519 elliptic curve [3].
After verification, F? types and specifications are erased during compilation and the
compiled code only performs efficient low-level operations. Indeed, after extraction to C
by KreMLin, our verified implementations are very slightly but consistenly faster than
unverified C implementations of the same primitives in libsodium [24] and OpenSSL (Table 1).
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3.2 Game-Based Cryptography
Going beyond functional correctness, we sketch how we use Low? to do security proofs in
the standard model of cryptography, using “authenticated encryption with associated data”
(AEAD) as a sample construction. AEAD is the main protection mechanism for the TLS
record layer; it secures most Internet traffic.
AEAD has a generic security proof by reduction to two core functionalities: a stream cipher
(such as ChaCha20) and a one-time-MAC (such as Poly1305). The cryptographic, game-based
argument supposes that these two algorithms meet their intended ideal functionalities, e.g.,
that the cipher is indistinguishable from a random function. Idealization is not perfect, but is
supposed to hold against computationally limited adversaries, except with small probabilities,
say εChaCha20 and εPoly1305. The argument then shows that the AEAD construction also
meets its own ideal functionality, except with probability say Chacha20 + Poly1305.
To apply this security argument to our implementation of AEAD, we need to encode
such assumptions. To this end, we supplement our real Low? code with ideal F? code. For
example, ideal AEAD is programmed as follows:
encryption generates a fresh random ciphertext, and it records it together with the
encryption arguments in a log.
decryption simply looks up an entry in the log that matches its arguments and returns
the corresponding plaintext, or reports an error.
These functions capture both confidentiality (ciphertexts do not depend on plaintexts) and
integrity (decryption only succeeds on ciphertexts output by encryption). Their behaviors
are precisely captured by typing, using pre- and post-conditions about the ghost log shared
between them, and abstract types to protect plaintexts and keys.
The abstract type of keys and the encryption function for idealizing AEAD is below:
type entry = cipher ∗ data ∗ nonce ∗ plain
abstract type key = { key: keyBytes; log: if Flag.aead then ref (seq entry) else unit }
let encrypt (k:key) (n:nonce) (p:plain) (a:data) =
if Flag.aead
then let c = random_bytes cipher_len in k.log := (c, a, n, p) :: k.log; c
else encrypt k.key n p a
A module Flag declares a set of abstract booleans (idealization flags) that precisely capture
each cryptographic assumption. For every real functionality that we wish to idealize, we
branch on the corresponding flag.
This style of programming heavily relies on the normalization capabilities of F?. At
verification time, flags are kept abstract, so that we verify both the real and ideal versions of
the code. At extraction time, we reveal these booleans to be false. The F? normalizer then
drops the then branch, and replaces the log field with (), meaning that both the high-level,
list-manipulating code and corresponding type definitions are erased, leaving only low-level
code from the else branch to be extracted.
Using this technique, we verify by typing e.g. that our AEAD code, when using any ideal
cipher and one-time MAC, perfectly implements ideal AEAD. We also rely on typing to
verify that our code complies with the pre-conditions of the intermediate proof steps. As
a consequence of our proof, we are forced to establish various intensional properties of our
code, e.g., that our code does not reuse nonces (a common cryptographic pitfall); that it has
no buffer overruns (a common pitfall of low-level programming); etc.
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4 Ongoing Work
4.1 Verified Assembly Language and Safe Interoperability with C
While Low? and KreMLin provide reasonably efficient C-like implementations of cryptogra-
phy, for the highest performance, cryptographic code often relies on complex hand-tuned
assembly routines that are customized for individual hardware platforms. For this we have
designed Vale, a new DSL that supports foundational, automated verification of high-
performance assembly code. The Vale tool transforms annotated assembly programs into
deeply embedded terms in a verification language, together with proofs that the terms meet
their specifications. So far, we have used Dafny [17] as the embedding language for Vale
and used this tool chain to verify the correctness and security of implementations of SHA-256
on x86 and ARM, Poly1305 on x64, and hardware-accelerated AES-CBC on x86. Several
implementations meet or beat the performance of unverified, state-of-the-art cryptographic
libraries.
In ongoing work, we have begun to use F? as the embedding language for Vale, and
are mechanizing a formal model of interoperability between Low? and Vale. By defining
the deeply embedded semantics of Vale in F? as a Low? interpreter for assembly language
terms, we aim to show that invocations from C to assembly can be accounted for within a
single semantics for both DSLs. A key challenge here is to reconcile Low?’s CompCert-like
structured memory model with Vale’s “big array of bytes” view of memory.
4.2 An Early Deployment of Everest within libcurl
Emphasizing the incremental deployment of our verified code, we have integrated our verified
TLS record layer extracted from Low? to C, as well as Vale implementations in assembly,
within a new version of miTLS [7], implemented in F?, covering TLS-1.2 and TLS-1.3. Our
eventual goal is for miTLS to be implemented entirely in the Low? subset of F? and extracted
solely to C, with functional correctness and security proofs. However, as of now, miTLS is
only partially verified (the handshake being the main, remaining unverified component) and
extracts to OCaml. However, already, by virtue of basic type safety, our partially verified
version of miTLS provides safety against low-level attacks (e.g. HeartBleed) similar to other
OCaml-based implementations of TLS [15].
Relying on OCaml’s foreign function interface, we integrate miTLS extracted to OCaml
with the verified TLS record layer extracted to C-and-assembly. Dually, we provide C
bindings for calling into a miTLS layer which handles the socket abstraction, fragmenting
buffers, etc. The result is a libmitls.dll, which we integrate within libcurl, a popular
open-source library, used pervasively in many tools. This early integration allows us to use
our verified software from within popular command line tools, like git, providing immediate
benefits.
5 Parting Thoughts
A significant novelty of our proposed work is that we aim to replace security-critical compo-
nents of existing software with provably correct versions. Our careful choice of the problem
domain is crucial: verified OS kernels and compilers can only succeed by replacing the
software stack or development toolchain; verified, standardized, security protocols, and
HTTPS and TLS in particular, can be deployed within the existing ecosystem, providing a
large boost to software security at a small overall cost.
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With the emergence of TLS 1.3, most TLS implementers will rewrite their code from
scratch, and the world will be faced with migrating towards brand new implementations.
History tells us that widespread adoption of a new version of TLS may take almost an entire
decade. Given a similar time line for the adoption of TLS 1.3, if we distribute Everest within
2–4 years in a form where the cost of switching to it is negligible, then we are optimistic that
it stands a chance of widespread adoption.
Despite this once-in-a-decade opportunity, several challenges remain. How will verified
code authored in advanced programming languages be maintained and evolved going forward?
Distributing our code as well-documented, source-like C may help somewhat, but to evolve
the code while maintaining verification guarantees will require continued support from the
Everest team, as well as outreach and education. Will the software industry at large be able
to appreciate the technical benefits of verified code? How can we empirically “prove” that
verified software is better? One direction may be to deploy, standalone, small-TCB versions
of Everest and to demonstrate it is resistant to practical attacks – this raises the possibility
of deployments of Everest within fully verified stacks [16, 14, 13] or sandboxes [23].
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